UCITS funds are mutual funds that are regulated by pan-European guidelines and can easily be distributed throughout Europe. We study the empirical performance of a survivorship bias-free sample of alternative UCITS funds. Most importantly, as alternative UCITS funds are often marketed as regulated hedge funds, we compare them with offshore hedge funds. Our results show that alternative UCITS offer similar raw returns but lower standard deviations during the full sample period. However, singleindex models show that alternative UCITS funds provide only marginal exposure to variation in hedge fund returns. Multifactor models indicate that the most important risk factors for both alternative UCITS funds and matched hedge funds strategies are related to stock market risks. However, alternative UCITS funds exhibit a significantly lower exposure to these factors than hedge funds. Furthermore, they load on different risk factors, suggesting that alternative UCITS and hedge funds follow different strategies. We test more formally whether alternative mutual funds and hedge funds constitute different asset classes. In particular, we assess the degree of the value added for an investor in terms of enhanced diversification benefits by implementing a spanning test and find that both groups are different asset classes with time-varying diversification properties.
I. Introduction
This study analyzes the performance of a survivorship bias-free sample of alternative UCITS funds and compares them to offshore hedge funds. UCITS funds are mutual funds regulated by pan-European guidelines and can easily be distributed throughout Europe. The regulatory framework allows investments in several asset classes and a variety of derivative products that can be used to implement strategies previously known from hedge funds. The interest in alternative mutual funds in general and alternative UCITS funds in particular has grown in the wake of the financial crisis. According to Busack and Tille (2010) , investors are longing for more liquid, transparent, and regulated alternative investment products. At the same time fund managers are looking for new distribution channels to broaden their investor base and bolster up their assets previously lost due to high investor redemptions (Eschenbacher, 2010) . Analyzing the empirical performance of UCITS funds that follow alternative investment strategies and comparing them with offshore hedge funds arguably can reveal insights whether the UCITS structure is suitable for investors who want to invest hedge fund strategies. This question is of utmost practical importance, given the survey results in Amenc and Sender (2010) that European investors are tightly constrained to invest in offshore hedge funds. Therefore, UCITS funds may be a tool to accommodate investments in alternative strategies due to their relatively large degrees of freedom with respect to the use of derivatives. However, one could also argue that the UCITS framework is not suitable for alternative strategies. The framework comes with higher liquidity and diversification requirements, short selling restrictions, and additional costs which might lead to a dilution of (offshore) hedge fund returns. Moreover, there are regulatory concerns whether a tightly regulated product targeting retail investors should be allowed to follow hedge fund strategies (Eschenbacher, 2010) .
Several recent papers study the performance of alternative mutual funds. Aggarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009) are the first to compare U.S. alternative mutual funds to hedge funds. Huang
and Wang (2010) analyze a sample of alternative U.S. equity funds. Tille (2010, 2012) , Tuchschmid, Wallerstein, and Zanolin (2010) and Tuchschmid and Wallerstein (2013) extend this research to a sample of UCITS funds. We add to this strand of literature on alternative mutual funds in three ways. First, we explicitly estimate a survivorship bias for alternative UCITS funds, an issue that has been omitted in the prior literature. Second, we analyze a comprehensive set of alternative UCITS strategies and compare them to their matched offshore counterparts. While Aggarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009) and Huang and Wang (2010) analyze relatively small samples of alternative mutual funds, Tuchschmid, Wallerstein, and Zanolin (2010) and Tuchschmid and Wallerstein (2013) analyze alternative UCITS mainly on an aggregated basis, and Tille (2010, 2012) analyze the performance of these funds in a simple and descriptive manner. Third, our empirical framework allows us to provide a more detailed analysis of the risk-return-profile of alternative mutual funds and evaluate the suitability of the UCITS framework to accommodate different hedge fund strategies.
Our results indicate that alternative UCITS fund offer similar raw returns but lower standard deviations than offshore hedge funds during our full sample period. However, single-index models reveal that alternative UCITS funds provide only marginal exposure to variation in hedge fund returns. Using multi-factor models, our results show that the most important risk factors for both alternative UCITS funds and hedge funds are related to stock market risks.
However, alternative UCITS funds exhibit a significantly lower exposure to these factors than hedge funds; this finding is similar to Tuchschmid, Wallerstein, and Zanolin (2010) and Tuchschmid and Wallerstein (2013) . Furthermore, we document that matched strategies load on different risk factors, indicating that alternative UCITS and hedge funds indeed follow different strategies. For the time period after the financial crisis, we further show that the returns of alternative UCITS funds have become more sensitive to systematic risk factors. At the same time, the performance of these funds deteriorated. To our knowledge, we are the first who estimate a survivorship bias for a sample of alternative mutual funds. Our estimated bias is in line with results from previous literature on mutual funds and indicates that neglecting this bias might provoke misleading results. Finally, we test whether alternative mutual funds and hedge funds constitute different asset classes. We assess the degree of the value added for an investor in terms of enhanced diversification benefits by using a spanning test. In fact, we find that both groups are different asset classes with time-varying diversification properties.
The remainder is structured as follows: Section II provides an overview of the UCITS framework. Section III describes the data and our methodology, and Section IV presents descriptive statistics. Section V compares the risk-return-profiles of UCITS funds and hedge funds. Section VI shows the results from mean-variance spanning test. Finally, section VII concludes.
II. The UCITS framework

A. Development of the UCITS directive
The term "UCITS" stands for "Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities", which corresponds to a plain vanilla mutual fund. The specialty of UCITS compliant funds is that they are regulated according to a pan-European standard to facilitate cross-border marketing within the European Union. Therefore, UCITS funds are not automatically funds that use hedge fund-like strategies, but they are for the main part equity, bond, or balanced long-only mutual funds. However, the development of the European regulation allows for the implementation of hedge fund-like strategies within the UCITS framework, and this possibility has led to an increased interest of fund managers and investors in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.
The following discussion provides a brief overview over the development of the UCITS regulation and the possibilities it offers to asset managers. UCITS is a European Union-wide harmonized mutual fund structure for open-end mutual funds. It was established in 1985 (85/611/EEC) to provide fund management companies with a means of cross-border selling and help establish a European capital market. The directive sets rules and obligations concerning the setup and operation (i.e., investment guidelines, transparency, and liquidity) of funds, focusing on protection of fund investors. Following its adoption in 1985, several amendments to the directive were made. Structuring a hedge fund-like product was not possible from the start of the UCITS directive, and only the introduction of the so called product directive (2001/108/EC) allows the use of derivatives for investment purposes and enables introducing products with a hedge fund-like strategy into the UCITS framework. However, only a few funds used the possibilities that arose from the product directive immediately, and the number of alternative funds has started to grow slowly. In fact, the proper use of derivatives was not 
B. Possibilities and limitations for hedge fund strategies under the UCITS directive
The UCITS directive allows investments in certain assets only, which are specified in the product directive (2001/108/EC) and the eligible assets guidelines (CESR/07-044 and CESR/ 07-433). Generally, as the name suggests, investments in transferable securities (e.g., stocks
and bonds) are allowed. Furthermore, money market instruments, shares of other regulated funds, bank deposits, and financial derivatives (listed and OTC) are eligible assets for UCITS funds. The use of financial derivative instruments for investment purposes arguably is the most important element to set up hedge fund-like strategies. Using derivatives, funds can implement dynamic trading strategies, leveraged positions, and short sales, all of which are techniques traditionally applied by hedge funds only. Because direct physical short-selling of securities is prohibited under the UCITS framework, short investments can only be implemented using synthetic short positions via derivatives. This limitation is a drawback of UCITS funds compared to traditional hedge funds and potentially leads to weaker performance due to higher costs and trading frictions. Another drawback of UCITS funds compared to hedge funds is that outright leverage by borrowing is limited to 10% of a fund's net asset value (NAV) if it is on a temporary basis (85/611 EEC, Art. 36 No. 1) . Therefore, only indirect leverage via margin deposits for derivatives can be applied, which might also imply that UCITS funds lag behind offshore hedge funds in terms of performance and limits the suitability of the UCITS framework for certain hedge fund strategies that heavily rely on leverage (e.g., relative value arbitrage). However, indirect leverage obtained via derivatives can be very large, and in some funds it can reach values of more than 1,000% of the funds' NAV.
The following is an excerpt from the a supplement of the prospectus of the Merrill Lynch Investment Solutions SICAV (AQR Global Relative Value UCITS Fund): "Based on the sum of the notional of financial derivative instruments approach, the Sub-Fund's expected level of leverage will generally vary from 800% to 1800% of the Sub-Fund's NAV. Based on the commitment approach, the Sub-Fund's expected level of leverage will generally vary from 800% to 1800% of the Sub-Fund's NAV. The Sub-Fund's level of leverage may possibly be higher under certain circumstances including but not limited to a low market volatility environment."
However, it is subject to limits, as specified in Art. index replication is impossible for investors due to missing information on index methodology, rebalancing, constituents, and their weights. In addition to these new guidelines, the implementation of strategies within the UCITS framework is practically limited by liquidity constraints and diversification requirements. UCITS funds have to provide investors the possibility to redeem their shares at least twice a month. Although not specified by the regulator, twice a month means that it is possible to redeem at least in fortnightly intervals (and not on two days close to each other; Simmonds, 2011) . Moreover, in contrast to hedge funds, UCITS funds are generally not allowed to use gates and side pockets, which further limit investments in illiquid assets. All these restrictive features arguably lead to inferior performance of UCITS funds compared to hedge funds (e.g., due to missing liquidity premiums).
Article 22 of directive 85/611/EEC specifies the diversification requirements a UCITS fund has to comply with. The most important restrictions are the general limits to position sizes and OTC counterparty exposures. Generally, a UCITS fund may invest no more than 5% of its assets into securities issued by the same body, and the maximum OTC counterparty exposure amounts to 10% if the counterparty is a credit institution (Art. 22 No. 1 85/611/EEC). How-2 The limits of indirect leverage depend on the methodology chosen to calculate market exposure via derivatives. A manager can choose between three different methodologies, depending on the complexity of the strategy and derivatives used. Leverage can either be calculated using the "commitment approach", the "relative VaRapproach", or the "absolute VaR approach" and is limited to either 200% of the funds' NAV, twice the 99%-VaR of a derivative-free reference portfolio or 20% of the 20-day 99%-VaR, subject to the results of stress tests. ever, the former 5% limit can be increased to 10% if the sum of all positions larger than 5%
does not exceed 40%.
Overall, the regulatory framework for UCITS provides different degrees of suitability to implement the variety of hedge fund strategies. Amenc and Sender (2010) and Simmonds (2011) provide an overview which hedge fund strategies are suitable for the UCITS framework. According to Simmonds (2011) , equity strategies, global macro, managed futures, event driven
(mainly merger and index arbitrage), or (liquid) credit strategies can be implemented within the UCITS framework. In their industry survey, Amenc and Sender (2010) is quite small (0.6% and 1.3%, respectively). With only three and 13 funds having ceased to exist, respectively, they simply exclude these funds from their analyses.
In an attempt to provide more insight on survivorship issues prior to 2009, we search for defunct funds using the Bloomberg database. Our search criteria are similar to those chosen in Agarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009) . In particular, we search for the keywords neutral, absolute, short, regardless, independent, derivative, futures, hedge, and options for all funds labeled as UCITS compliant and available for sale in Germany. After removing funds that contain the terms reserve, short-term, or liquidity in their name and thus arguably are money market funds, our search results in a list of 950 individual funds that were live, defunct or merged. Where available, we also screen funds' sales prospectuses, annual reports, marketing materials or press releases to validate the investment strategy. We add another 34 funds to the funds already obtained from Absolut Research and Morningstar and obtain a sample of 1014 (=933+47+33) funds, of which are 797 live and 217 defunct by the end of April 2012.
Our sample also includes rules-based funds that offer access to long-short investment strategies; these funds' investment processes strictly adhere to a systematic process and defines fully transparent trading rules. 5 The inclusion of these strategies is motivated by the findings in Hsieh (2001, 2004) There are two problems that may arise from our search algorithm. The first problem is that we only obtain current fund names and investment strategies, but fund names and investment strategies might change over time. For example, Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005) document that mutual funds change their name to increase fund flows by adopting a name that reflects an en vogue investment style. They also document, that name changes are sometimes associated with a change in investment style. Fund inception dates on the other hand relate to the date when a fund commences its operation, which is a fixed date published in the fund's legal documents. It is therefore possible that a fund has a long track record, but that this track record is not representative for the fund's current investment strategy. As data collection starts in 2009 but we obtain funds with track records dating back to 2002, we cannot be completely sure that a fund's full track record is representative for its current investment strategy (which is especially a problem for funds incepted prior to database inception). Bloomberg stores corporate actions (e.g., name changes, liquidations, merger dates, or dividends for mutual funds).
We screen all funds for potential name changes. Whenever we identify a fund that changed its name during our sample period, we attempt to clarify whether the name change has been accompanied by a strategy change (using fund documents, press releases, or direct contact to fund companies). Following this screening procedure, we only include the relevant history where a fund followed an alternative investment strategy. We identify 207 funds with changing names, and in 51 instances these name changes were accompanied by a strategy change.
Another potential problem may arise as funds can change their legal structure, either by a redomiciliation or a change of their investment guidelines to conform to the UCITS regulation, but keep their acquired track record. We identify 33 funds that changed their legal structure and opted to conform to the UCITS guidelines but maintained their prior track record. Given the small number of these cases, we include the prior performance to get time series that are as long as possible. One could argue that the performance prior to adopting the UCITS guidelines is not representative for a fund's current performance, possibly due to the tighter UCITS regulation (e.g., prohibition of physical short sales). Although there is evidence that managers sometimes take actions that are not in the interest of investors to increase fund flows and thus their remuneration (Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 199; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Cooper, Gulen, and Rau, 2005) , we argue that a fund might not choose to convert into a more regulated structure if that impaired its strategy, leading to subsequent dismal performance. First, there is anecdotal evidence that hedge fund managers who simply want to broaden their investor clientele and increase the asset base do set up UCITS funds but maintain the offshore fund and manage both funds side-by-side. Second, the regulator allows funds to disclose past performance in the case of re-domiciliation and change of investment guidelines only if the (voluntary) investment restrictions and strategy prior to and after adopting the UCITS structure do not differ materially. Third, alternative UCITS funds have a fee structure comparable to offshore hedge funds, consisting of an annual management fee as well as a performance related fee. An ex-ante expected dismal performance would lead to an expected reduced income from the incentive fee and thus hurts a manager's income. For all these reasons, potential biases from the inclusion of prior non-UCITS performance should be small.
B. Empirical methodology
Single-index models and a seven-factor model in the spirit of Fung and Hsieh (2004) are used for performance measurement. Single-index models apply regressions of equally-weighted UCITS portfolio excess returns on excess returns of matched hedge fund indexes. We use the HFR index description to match the UCITS categories with hedge fund indexes. UCITS categories were taken from the Absolut Research fund classification because there is no common industry standard how to classify alternative UCITS funds. For Equity Hedge or Event Driven the matching is straightforward; in all other cases we use the hedge fund index closest to an alternative mutual fund's category. We use equally-weighted portfolios to increase our sample size as there are a number of funds that do not report assets on a monthly basis to Bloomberg.
The HFR indices are also constructed using equally-weighted returns.
Extending the single-index framework, we also estimate a seven-factor model for UCITS funds and hedge funds to compare their different factor exposures:
where denotes either the excess return on an equally-weighted UCITS portfolio or the excess return on a HFR index. Our model differs from Fung and Hsieh (2004) in that it uses the Fama and French (2012) yield. Finally we use three trend following variables from Hsieh (2001, 2004) to account for dynamic trading strategies, in particular, the bond (PTFSBD), foreign exchange (PTFSFX) and commodity (PTFSCOM) trend following factors. 9 Finally, is a mean zero error term. All factor portfolio returns are converted into Euros.
Both the single-index and seven-factor models use excess returns on equally-weighted portfolios as the dependent variable. We use the 1-month Euribor rate from Bloomberg to calculate excess returns. We also recalculate the Fama and French (2012) 
IV. Data description and biases
A. Descriptive statistics
We only consider funds with a performance history of at least 12 months, which reduces our initial sample from 1014 to 900 funds. From these 900 funds, 710 were extant at the end of our sample period as of 30 th April 2012. Although it has been possible to set up alternative mutual funds since implementation of the UCITS III directive, the trend to launch alternative mutual funds started to take off with the evolution of the recent financial crisis. Panel A of Table 1 depicts the number of funds available at the end of each year. While there were a moderate amount of funds prior to 2007, the number of funds more than doubled between 2008 and 2010, arguably due to discussions of tighter hedge fund regulation (Amenc and Sender, 2010) or higher liquidity of UCITS (no gates and side pockets). Nonetheless, following this boom, it now seems that there is a phase of consolidation as the total number of funds decreased towards the end of our sample period. As expected, the largest group are long/short equity funds followed by equity market neutral funds (see Panel B), arguably because these strategies are perceived to be least impaired by UCITS regulation (Amenc and Sender, 2010) .
Approximately 50% of the funds were domiciled in Luxembourg, which corresponds to Luxembourg's role as European's largest fund domicile (see Panel C).
[Insert Table 1 here]
Panel D of Table 1 provides an overview of the performance differences for live and defunct funds. During our sample period 190 UCITS funds ceased to exist, a number that is substantially higher than the 3 and 13 defunct reported in Tuchschmid et al. (2010) and Tuchschmid and Wallerstein (2013) , respectively, as well as the 16 defunct funds reported in Busack and Tille (2010) . These funds were either liquidated, merged into other funds, or stopped reporting NAVs to Bloomberg. Most likely, all of these actions are performance related. In fact, the average annualized return of live funds is 1.6%. In contrast, defunct funds lost 2.5% per year, on average, resulting in a difference of approximately 4% per year (statistically significant at the 1% level). Interestingly, dead funds do not exhibit significantly higher standard deviations, but investors are likely to face more extreme losses as returns are more negatively skewed and exhibit higher excess kurtosis. In terms of Sharpe ratio, surviving funds signifi-cantly outperform non-surviving funds. Turning to risk-adjusted returns (i.e., the annualized seven factor alphas), alternative UCITS underperform by 1.6% per annum. Although surviving funds also exhibit a negative alpha, on average, they significantly outperform nonsurviving funds (-0.9% versus -3.9%).
Panel A of hedge funds exhibit, on average, much higher returns than alternative UCITS funds (HFR Index Composite with a an annual return of 10.2% and a standard deviation of 10.2%; in contrast, the corresponding measures for UCITS are 2.7% and 2.6%, respectively).
B. An estimate of the survivorship bias in alternative UCITS
The most prominent database biases are survivorship bias, selection bias and backfilling bias (Fung and Hsieh, 2000) . Table 3 shows the annualized return differences between these buy-and-hold portfolios. For example, the value of 0.95% (column 5, ence between both portfolios is positive for every investment period in our sample. There are only six evaluation periods for which the difference is not statistically significant; in all other cases the difference is significant at least at the 5% level.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Over the full sample period, the average annualized performance difference is 0.65%. Considering only the years from 2009 to 2012, the period after Absolut Research started collecting and maintaining data, this value does not change much and is actually lower with an average value of 0.55%. This is a hint that our search algorithm works quite well in detecting nonsurviving funds prior to collecting data. Our values for the survivorship bias are closer to the values found in the mutual funds literature than to those reported in the hedge fund literature.
It is close to the 0.80% in Brown and Goetzman's (1995) for equally-weighted mutual fund portfolios, and it is also of comparable magnitude to Elton, Gruber and Blake's (1996) estimates that vary between 0.60% and 0.77% when they apply a reinvestment assumption. Our estimate is slightly higher than the average value of 0.40% which Griese and Kempf (2003) document for their sample of German equity funds.
In addition to the return differences, Table 3 
V. Performance of alternative UCITS and hedge funds portfolios
A. Results from the single index model
An investor's concern who considers investing in alternative mutual funds is whether they deliver what they promise, i.e., access to the respective hedge fund strategies and similar risk- [Insert Table 4 here]
Over the full sample period, most of the alternative UCITS strategies fail to provide a reasonable exposure to the respective hedge fund strategies, both investable and non-investable. In particular, the estimated coefficients range from zero for Fixed Income Long/Short funds to 0.4 for Equity Long/Short strategies. Considering all funds as a group, the estimated exposure towards hedge funds is below 0.2 (column 4, Panels A and B). Interestingly, alternative UCITS are slightly more exposed to non-investable hedge fund returns than to investable.
Although slope coefficients are generally low, they are significant for most UCITS fund portfolios. The generally low R-squares indicate that alternative UCITS returns are driven by additional or other factors than traditional hedge fund returns. Equity Long/Short is the only group that is able to deliver notable, although reduced, hedge fund exposure.
In terms of risk-adjusted performance, most alternative UCITS portfolios exhibit positive, but insignificant alphas. The small outperformance corresponds to the earlier results in Table 2 , indicating higher raw returns and Sharpe ratios for several alternative UCITS portfolios. This finding is in contrast to Aggarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009) , who find a risk-adjusted outperformance of hedge funds. Nevertheless, it is in line with Tuchschmid et al. (2010) and Tuchschimd and Wallerstein (2013) , who also do not find evidence of significant underperformance. Given stricter regulation and probably higher associated costs, this observation is clearly surprising.
B. Results from the seven-factor model
A lack of hedge fund exposure does not automatically make alternative UCITS funds obsolete. If they load on different risk factors, they can still add value to an investor's portfolio through diversification. As the single index regressions only capture a small part of the entire return variation of alternative UCITS funds, we proceed by using our seven-factor model and analyze whether additional sources of risk drive the variation in alternative UCITS returns and whether these sources differ between hedge funds and alternative UCITS funds.
Aggarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009) show that the factor exposures of hedged mutual funds and traditional hedge funds do not differ significantly for most factors except for the size factor. Tuchschmid et al. (2010) find that a global index of UCITS hedge funds is significantly less exposed to equity market risk and credit spread risk compared to hedge funds, and
Tuchschmid and Wallerstein (2013) confirm this observation for the later sample period from September 2008 to June 2011. Our analysis not only considers a global fund portfolio, but rather a broad set of diverse alternative mutual fund strategies. Therefore, we are able to analyze risk exposures in a more detailed way (on the strategy level). The seven-factor model is estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). As the right-hand side is equal for all equations, this approach is equivalent to OLS estimation equation by equation (Zellner, 1962) . 15 Table 5 contains the results for the seven-factor model using our sample of alternative UCITS fund portfolios (in Panel A) and hedge fund indexes (in Panels B and C). The Over the full sample period, factor exposures of alternative UCITS funds vary across the different strategies, but are largely as expected (see Panel A). Equity-oriented strategies load significantly on the equity risk factors, while fixed income strategies tend to load on the bond and credit factors. Managed Futures show significant exposure to two of the three trend following factors. The signs of the estimated factor coefficients are also as expected, i.e., positive for equity market risks and negative for bond market and spread risks as converging spreads and falling yields will lead to higher prices of the respective securities. The results for Equity Long/Short UCITS and for the aggregated portfolio of UCITS funds indicate that Equity Long/Short funds dominate the sample given that the results are quite similar. Panels B and C reveal that different hedge fund strategies exhibit similar factor exposures. In particular, while the estimated coefficients on market and size are almost always significant, the coefficients on the other factors are generally not insignificant across the different hedge fund strategies. This is a remarkable result given hedge funds' diverse investment strategies as well as the different underlying markets/assets they are assumed to invest in (with global macro being an exception). In terms of risk-adjusted performance (alpha), alternative UCITS neither significantly under-nor outperform, which is similarly the case for most of the non-investable hedge fund indices. However, investable hedge funds largely underperform, exhibiting significantly negative alphas of 30 to 40 basis points per month. The observable underperformance of investable hedge fund indexes may indicate that superior fund managers close their funds to new investors, as proposed by Naik, Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007) .
[Insert Table 5 here]
The model delivers R-squares between 0.3 and 0.6 for the different alternative UCITS strategies, which is similar to the explanatory power reported in Aggarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009), Tuchschmid et al. (2010) and Tuchschmid and Wallerstein (2013) . The R-squares for hedge fund indexes (ranging from 0.6 to 0.9) are generally higher than for alternative UCITS funds. Therefore, it seems that alternative UCITS funds are less exposed to the standard hedge fund sources of risk.
Size and statistical significance of the coefficients alone do not provide an indication whether alternative UCITS funds and hedge funds are really different. Therefore, we conduct Wald tests were each individual coefficient of a given UCITS strategy is compared to the coefficient of its matched hedge fund index. Over the full sample period and over all funds, there are several significant differences between alternative UCITS funds and hedge funds. In fact, alternative UCITS fund significantly outperform investable hedge funds and are significantly less exposed to equity markets and small cap stocks, which makes them a potentially better diversifier for an investor's traditional equity risk. This pattern is also observable for single UCITS strategies. For example, the estimated coefficient on the size factor is around 0.1 for alternative UCITS, while it is around 0.6 for hedge funds. Small cap stocks are more illiquid and riskier than large cap stocks (Amihud, 2002) , thus they may be inappropriate for alternative UCITS funds. Furthermore, the exposure of UCITS funds against the credit spread factor differs from hedge funds for most strategies. For UCITS funds the estimated coefficient is mostly negative (long spread risks), while it is positive for most hedge fund indexes (short spread risks). With respect to the trend following factors, there are usually no significant differences, except for macro-related UCITS strategies and the bond and commodity trendfollowing factors. Both are insignificant for UCITS funds, but significant for macro hedge funds. Differences for the commodity trend-following factor are likely to be explained by the fact that UCITS funds are not allowed to invest in physical commodities and commodity futures. In addition, commodity swaps and certificates on commodities were not readily available during the entire sample period.
C. Subsample results
Our sample period is quite heterogeneous; there is a bull market between 2003 and mid-2007, followed by market disruptions during the recent financial crisis and their aftermath. Presumably, hedge funds and alternative UCITS funds will have time-varying factor exposures and performance differences over time. Furthermore, as illustrated above, the growth of alternative UCITS funds really took-off after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the Madoff fraud, and it has been since then when more and more hedge fund managers have recognized the potential of the UCITS framework to set up retail hedge funds. As more funds became available, it is more likely that a convergence between hedge funds and retail funds has occurred, enabling investors to better access hedge fund-like payoff profiles. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the prior two models for the peculiar subsample period January 2009 until April 2012 . For the sake of brevity, the results are not tabulated.
In the single-index model the estimated coefficients in the subperiod do not change notably and are by and large of the same magnitude. In terms of convergence, as measured by the Rsquare, we find mixed evidence. The R-square for the aggregated portfolio, which includes all UCITS funds, does not increase and indicates that no convergence has taken place. The R- 
vs. HFRI). This is a surprising result as one particularly expects
convergence to occur within this group of funds; in fact, Equity Long/Short hedge fund strategies are believed to be most suited for replication (Amenc and Senders, 2010) .
Using the seven-factor model, we find that the R-square increases from 0.75 to 0.81 for the global alternative UCITS portfolio. Hedge funds' R-squares also increase from 0.85 to 0.89 (HFRX Global) and from 0.9 to 0.93 (HFRI Composite). Standard hedge fund risk factors became more important towards the end of our sample period, both for alternative UCITS and hedge funds. Moreover, the R-square of UCITS funds is now closer to the R-square of hedge fund indexes. Given the decreased and lower R-squares in the single-index regressions, we conclude that alternative UCITS funds and hedge funds share the same underlying pool of strategies and markets, but they invest differently at least to some extent. On a strategy level, we find only one strategy whose R-square has not increased (Managed Futures). Consistent with the single-index results, the most notable increases in R-square occurred for fixed income and Equity Market Neutral UCITS funds. One reason why the R-squares for UCITS might have increased is that equity risks and spread risks have become more important in terms of statistical significance. A larger number of estimated coefficients become statistically significant for the individual strategies during the subsample period. Considering that the dif-ferent strategies now tend to load in the same way on these risk factors, it seems that alternative UCITS funds have become more similar to each other towards the end of the sample.
Other risk factors are usually insignificant except bond yields for fixed income funds and some trend following factors for macro-related UCITS funds. The increase in the significance of systematic risk factors likely explains the decrease in estimated alphas. Although alphas remain insignificant for most UCITS strategies, they are lower compared to the estimated alphas during the full period. Huang and Wang (2010) document similar time series patterns for a sample of U.S. hedge fund-like mutual funds, i.e., reduced alphas during times of crisis.
Exposures and R-squares of hedge funds remain largely unchanged in our subsample period.
Market and size risks are still the dominant risk factors for hedge funds. However, the coefficients for market risk slightly decreased, and the coefficients for the size factor slightly increased. Other factors are almost always insignificant; this is also the case for spread risks.
Contrary to UCITS funds, hedge funds exhibit better performance between 2009 and 2012.
The underperformance of investable hedge funds vanished, and non-investable hedge funds outperformed alternative UCITS funds. Wald coefficient tests reveal that differences between hedge funds and UCITS funds remain significant, again indicating that they follow different
strategies. An example are spread risks, which are important for alternative UCITS but less important for hedge funds. Moreover, UCITS funds are still significantly less exposed to equity market risk factors, particularly when compared to non-investable hedge funds. Macrorelated UCITS funds are also less exposed to the returns from trend-following strategies as the estimated coefficients are significantly lower than those of macro hedge funds.
Summing up, our findings underline that hedge funds and alternative UCITS funds represent quite distinct investment products that follow different strategies. From an investor's point of view, who wants to invest in hedge funds but is constrained to invest in onshore funds by the regulatory authorities, this result is disappointing. It is even more so as the growing supply of funds did not change this basic results.
VI. Mean-variance spanning tests
Our results so far indicate that even strategies that have similar matching hedge fund indexes (Equity Long/Short, Equity Market Neutral, Managed Futures or Event Driven) do not neces-sarily share the same risk characteristics. This leads to the question, whether alternative UCITS fund and hedge funds really constitute different asset classes. Therefore, we conduct mean-variance spanning tests following Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) . They test the joint hypothesis that all regression intercepts for a portfolio of test assets regressed on a benchmark portfolio are equal to zero. This is economically equivalent to testing whether the Sharpe ratio of a portfolio consisting of the benchmark assets significantly changes by adding the test assets. 16 We use investable and non-investable hedge funds as benchmark assets and alternative UCITS fund as test assets. We conduct the tests for the full sample period as well as two subperiods (January 2002 to December 2008 and January 2009 to April 2012 to see whether diversification properties changed over time. Table 6 summarizes the results of our spanning tests.
The first two columns in Table 6 indicate that alternative UCITS fund and hedge funds are separate asset classes, as the test rejects the spanning null hypothesis for almost every case.
An exception is the last subperiod, where investable hedge funds form the benchmark portfolio. This result again suggests that alternative UCITS fund do not deliver what they promise.
Because alternative strategies are usually no stand-alone investments, we further test whether they are able to improve the Sharpe ratio of a traditional stock-bond portfolio. Taking the position of a European investor, we use the MSCI Europe Total Return Index as our stock portfolio and the iBoxx Eurozone Sovereigns Total Return Index as our bond portfolio. We then test whether UCITS funds are able to shift the efficient frontier of a portfolio that, in addition to stocks and bonds, also includes hedge funds. Over the entire period alternative UCITS as well as non-investable hedge funds are able to significantly shift the Sharpe ratio of the stockbond portfolio, implying that they serve as diversifiers for traditional investments. Investable hedge funds, however, are not able to generate a significant shift of a traditional portfolio's efficient frontier. Furthermore, alternative UCITS funds are able to shift the efficient frontier of a portfolio consisting of stocks, bonds, and a set of hedge fund strategies. Therefore, we again conclude that alternative UCITS fund and hedge funds are distinct asset classes.
[Insert Table 6 here] 16 Inherent to this interpretation is the assumption that there exists a risk-free rate which transforms the efficient frontier into a straight line (Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken, 1989) .
Analyzing the subperiods, we observe that the result for alternative UCITS funds is driven by the results from the first subperiod (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . In the latter period, alternative UCITS strategies were neither able to change the Sharpe ratio of a portfolio consisting of stocks, bonds, and hedge funds nor of a traditional stock-bond portfolio. During this period, government bonds exhibit strong returns due to drastic declines in interest rates in the wake of central banks quantitative easing. In contrast, for hedge funds the spanning test results suggest that they are able to shift a traditional portfolio's Sharpe ratio during the [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] period; the test rejects for non-investable, albeit not for investable hedge funds. This is most likely driven by the strong performance of Relative Value Arbitrage hedge funds that profited from a drastic tightening of credit spreads beginning in 2009 and extending through 2012. Taken together, alternative UCITS and hedge funds seem to constitute different asset classes. While alternative UCITS possess time-varying differences in their diversification benefits towards traditional assets, at least non-investable hedge funds were able to continuously act as a diversifying asset class. Considering the wider investment opportunities of offshore hedge funds, this result confirms our ex ante expectations.
VII. Conclusions
Alternative UCITS funds have gained popularity in the years following the recent financial crisis. UCITS funds are pan-European regulated mutual funds that try to implement strategies previously known from the hedge fund arena. Given the tendency to increase regulation of alternative offshore funds in Europe, these funds are, at least theoretically, a viable alternative to a variety of offshore hedge funds. We analyze a large sample of alternative UCITS funds, which is free of survivorship bias. In terms of raw returns, alternative UCITS funds deliver comparable results to non-investable hedge funds and outperform investable hedge funds, at least over the full sample period. Furthermore, they have lower standard deviations and smaller tail risks. We further document a significant difference between live and defunct alternative UCITS funds. According to our estimates, the survivorship bias amounts to 0.5% per year.
We also compare the risk profiles of a comprehensive set of alternative UCITS strategies and matching offshore strategies. During the full sample period, alternative UCITS funds deliver slightly better risk-adjusted returns. However, toward the end of our sample period hedge funds, especially non-investable funds tend to outperform alternative UCITS funds. Furthermore, we document that the risk profiles of alternative UCITS funds differ significantly from offshore hedge funds and that alternative UCITS fund are not able to provide an adequate exposure against offshore hedge fund strategies. Part of this difference is due to a reduced exposure of UCITS funds to common risk factors. Our results may be explained by differences in regulation and stricter risk limits of alternative UCITS funds. However, we also report notable differences in factor exposures between alternative UCITS funds and matched offshore funds, indicating that both are following different strategies. Finally, we test whether alternative UCITS funds and hedge funds constitute distinct asset classes, following the test procedure by Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) . The GRS-test rejects the null hypothesis of mean-variance spanning for every period. However, we document that alternative strategies can shift the efficient frontier of a traditional stock-bond portfolio, albeit the diversification benefits of alternative UCITS funds varies over time. As a result, a prudent investor should not rule out investments in one or the other asset class. Tables   Table 1  Number of Table 1 gives an overview of the number of funds that were extant at the end of each calendar year and at the end of the sample period in April 2012. Panels B and C report numbers of funds according to fund strategies and country of domicile at the end of our sample period. Panel D shows average annualized return, average standard deviation as well as average Sharpe ratio, skewness average excess kurtosis, seven factor alpha (Fung and Hsieh, 2001) and average adjusted R-square for live and defunct funds over the entire live span of individual funds. Absolute p-values for differences in means are calculated from standard t-tests. The table contains several descriptive time series statistics on risk, return and performance measures for alternative mutual funds (Panel A) as well as investable and non investable hedge funds (Panels B and C). All statistics are calculated using monthly data. Statistics for alternative mutual funds are calculated using equal weighted monthly fund returns. Statistics for hedge funds are calculated using the respective HFR indexes. All returns have been convert ed into Euro returns. Column (1) contains annualized monthly raw returns (in %), column (2) the annualized standard deviation (in %). Columns (3) and (4) contain values for skewness and excess kurtosis. Sharpe ratio (column 5), Sortino ratio (column 6), Omega ratio (column 7), annualized downside deviation (column 8, in %) and LPM-1 (columns 9, in %) are calculated using a return threshold of zero. Maximum drawdown (column 10, in %) is the maximum peak to trough loss. Column (11) The table displays annualized return differences (%) between buy-and-hold portfolios of surviving funds and all fund that were active at the start of an investment period. The first column shows the start of an investment period, the first row the end of an investment period. */**/*** indicates significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level. Newey April 2012, respectively , due to availability of funds following the respective strategies data availability. Column (1) shows the estimated monthly alphas. Colum (2) contains the t-statistics of two sided tests of alpha, where the null hypothesis is that alpha is zero. In column (3) shows the estimated beta against the respective hedge fund index, while column (4) contains the t-statistics of the test that beta in respect to the hedge fund index is zero. Standard Errors are calculated using heteroscedasticity and auto correlated consistent (HAC) standard errors according to Newey and West (1987) . Column (6) displays adjusted R-squares.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) This table contains the estimated coefficients using the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) approach, standard errors (in parentheses), and the adjusted R-squares for a seven-factor model following Fung and Hsieh (2004) . W_Mkt is the Fama/French (2012) excess return of a global stock market portfolio. W_SMB is the excess return of a portfolio of global small cap stocks over global large cap stocks. CE10Y is the change in the 10-year European government bond yield. CSPREAD is the change of the difference between the yield of the iBoxx Euro Corporate Bond 7-10 year index and the 10-year European government bond yield. PTFSBD, PFTSFX and PTFSCOM are the Fung and Hsieh (2001) bond, FX and commodity trend following factors. Column (9) shows adjusted R-squares. Panel A shows results for equally-weighted alternative UCITS fund portfolios, and panel B for the matched hedge fund indexes. In panel A the last row for each regression displays p-values for coefficient Wald tests which test whether the estimated coefficient of the alternative UCITS portfolio differs from the respective matched HFRX/HFRI index.
(1) (Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken, 1989 ) that tests whether the estimated intercepts in the regressions are all equal to zero, and p(W) is the corresponding p-value of W. |a| is the average absolute value of the regression intercept (i.e., monthly alpha). R² is the average R-square. All returns are excess returns (versus the 1-month Euribor) denominated in Euro. The first two models regress UCITS strategy portfolios (test assets) on hedge funds indexes (benchmark assets). In the next three models, fund portfolio returns are regressed on a portfolio of traditional assets consisting of stocks and bonds (SB; MSCI Europe TR Index and iBoxx Eurozone Sovereigns TR). The last two models show the results for regressions of UCITS portfolios on a benchmark portfolio including traditional assets as well as investable and noninvestable hedge funds, respectively. 
